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Moldovan Headaches 
 
The Republic of Moldova 120 days after the 2001 Parliamentary Elections 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The 2001 Parliamentary Elections in the Republic of Moldova were conducted in an atmos-
phere of extreme social and economic hardship. The average monthly salary in the former 
Soviet Republic, sandwiched between Romania and Ukraine, is around 30 US-Dollar today 
and the real GDP of the country has fallen to 30 percent of the pre-independence level1. 
Moldova, which has no natural resources and whose economy is dominated by the agricul-
tural sector, has now replaced Albania as the poorest country in Europe. When Moldovans 
were asked in a recent opinion poll what they fear most, 39 percent of the respondents an-
swered ‘poverty’. In the same poll 87 percent stated that their income is hardly enough to 
cover their minimum expenses and 52 percent said that they would leave Moldova for good or 
at least for a certain period of time2. Already today over 700,000 Moldovan citizens are said 
to be abroad. Ten years after independence, Moldova has become a country without much 
hope, battered not only by economic decline, corruption3 and debt4 but also by an identity 
crises. The discussions of the early nineties, on whether Moldova is a nation in its own right 
or simply an offshoot of Romania, have quieted down, but not disappeared altogether. The 
conflicts between pro-Romanian unionists and Moldovanists have made it also more difficult 
to create a civic identity, which would include the Russians, the Ukrainians, the Gagauz, the 
Bulgarians, the Jews and other non-Moldovans which account for nearly 35 percent of the 
Republic’s population.  
 
The growing pro-Romanian nationalism in the early nineties was also partly responsible for 
the outbreak of the separatist conflicts in the southern Gagauz and the eastern Transdniestrian 
region5. The conflict between the central government and the Gagauz did not escalate to 
large-scale violence and an autonomy solution was found in 19946. The conflict between 
Chisinau and the separatists in the Transdniestrian region, however, escalated during the 
spring of 1992 into a full-scale civil war which left over 1,000 people dead. Transdniestria, 
                                                                 
1  Leonid Cernei, Republik Moldova: Die Wahlen sind vorbei, aber Wahlen gibt es immer wieder, in: Rissener 
Rundbrief 4-5/2001, pp.35-40, p. 37. 
2  CSOP – Centrul pentru Studierea Opiniei si Pieþei, Barometrul de opinie publicã, Republica Moldova. 
ianuarie 2001. 
3  According to Transparency International, the Republic of Moldova is amongst the 25 most corrupt countries 
of the world, see Transparency International Annual Report 2000. 
4  By 1999 the external debt of Moldova had risen to 116% of the GDP, see UNDP, National Human Develop-
ment Report Republic of Moldova 2000, p. 73. 
5  See Jeff Chinn / Steve Ropers, Ethnic Mobilization and Reactive Nationalism: The Case of Moldova, in: 
Nationalities Papers, 23 (1995), 2, pp. 291-325; William Crowther, Ethnic Politics and the Post-Communist 
Transition in Moldova, in: Nationalities Papers, 26 (1998), 1, pp. 147-64. 
6  For the Gagauz conflict in Moldova see, inter alia, Jeff Chinn / Steve Ropers, Territorial Autonomy in 
Gagauzia, in: Nationalities Papers, 26 (1998), 1, pp. 87-10; Charles King, Gagauz-Yeri and the Dilemmas of 
Self-Determination, in: Transitions 1 (1995), 19, pp. 21-25; Rudolf Mark, Das Gesetz über die besondere 
Rechtsstellung von Gagausien (Gagauz-Yeri), in: WGO-Monatshefte für Osteuropäisches Recht, 37 (1995), 
5, pp. 291-297. Randolf Oberschmidt, Neue Satzung für Gagausien (Gagauz-Yeri) in der Republik Moldau, 
in: WGO-Monatshefte für Osteuropäisches Recht 41 (1999), 1, pp. 13-21; Vladimir Socor, Gagauz Auton-
omy in Moldova: A Precedent for Eastern Europe?, in: RFE/RL Research Report 3 (1994), 33, pp. 20-28; 
Vladimir Socor, Gagauz in Moldavia Demand Seperate Republic, in: Report on the USSR 2 (1990), 36, pp. 
8-13; Paula Thompson, The Gagauz in Moldova and Their Road to Autonomy, in: Magda Opalski [ed.], 
Managing Diversity in Plural Societies - Minorities, Migration and Nation-Building in Post-Communist 
Europe, Ontario 1998, pp. 128-147. 
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which represents the most industrialised part of the former Moldovan Socialist Soviet Repub-
lic, consolidated its de-facto independence in the years thereafter7. The resulting political and 
economic division of the country has aggravated Moldova's complicated situation even more.  
 
It was against this backdrop that the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova 
(PCRM)8 won the Moldovan parliamentary elections on 25 February 2001 by a large margin. 
Ten Years after the breakdown of the Soviet Empire a largely unreformed Communist Party 
has come to power in one of the former Soviet Republics. With slightly over 50 percent of the 
popular vote, the PCRM received 71 out of the 101 mandates in the Moldovan parliament. 
Thus, the Moldovan Communists have gained control of parliament, have been able to change 
the Constitution, have formed a government and elected their First Secretary as Head of State.  
 
An examination of the implications of this development will be the main task of this paper. 
Are democracy and market reforms now in danger? Will Moldova go East? Will the 
Transdniestrian conflict be resolved in the near future and what will happen to the Russian 
troops still stationed in this eastern Moldovan region? These are just some of the burning 
questions which have been raised since 25 February. Four months after the elections there 
may already be tentative answers to some. Before they can be tackled, however, it will be 
necessary to scrutinise the developments preceding the 2001 parliamentary elections, to 
briefly analyse the election campaign and the election itself and to look closely at the political 
decisions taken after 25 February. 
                                                                 
7  For more background information on the Transdniestrian conflict and the mediation efforts of the OSCE see, 
inter alia, Klemens Büscher, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen des OSZE-Konfliktmanagements in Moldova, in: 
Ethnos-Nation vol. 3 (1995), no. 2, pp. 71-85; Klemens Büscher, Separatismus in Transnistrien, in: Osteu-
ropa 46 (1996), pp. 860-75; Klemens Büscher, The Missions to the Republic of Moldova and the Ukraine: A 
Double-Entry Balance Sheet, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Ham-
burg/IFSH (ed.), OSCE Ye arbook 1999, Baden-Baden, pp. 195-210; Gottfried Hanne, Der Transnistrien-
Konflikt: Ursachen, Entwicklungsbedingungen und Perspektiven einer Regulierung. Berichte des BIOST 42-
1998. Stuart J Kaufman, Spiraling to Ethnic war. Elites, Masses and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War, in: 
International Security 21 (1996), 2, 108-38; Terrence P. Hopmann, The OSCE Role in Moldova and 
Ukraine, in: Studien und Berichte zur Sicherheitspolitik, 2000, no. 1, pp. 25-61; Stuart J Kaufman / Stephen 
R Bowers, Transnational Dimensions of the Transnistrian Conflict, in: Nationlites Papers vol. 26 (1998), no. 
1, pp.129-146; Pål Kolstø / Andrei Malgin, The Transnistrian Republic: A Case of Politicized Regionalism, 
in: Nationalities Papers, 26 (1998), pp. 103-127; Pål Kolstø, The Dniestr Conflict: Between Irredentism and 
Separtism, in: Europe-Asia-Studies 45 (1993), 6, pp. 973-1000; Claus Neukirch, Der Status Transnistriens 
aus politischer und völkerrechtlicher Sicht, Aktuelle Studien Nr. 3, Dezember 1998, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 
Büro Kiew; Stefan Troebst, Internationale Vermittlungsbemühungen zwischen Moldova und der selbster-
nannten „Transnistrischen Moldavischen Republik“. Als KSZE-Diplomat beiderseits des Dnjestr, in: Ber-
liner Osteuropa Info no. 5/95, pp. 18-22; Stefan Troebst, Kein spektakulärer Erfolg, aber Spannungen re-
duziert. Die OSZE in der Republik Moldova. Wissenschaft und Frieden vol. 15 (1996), no. 1, pp. 23-27; 
Stefan Troebst, Die OSZE in der Republik Moldova 1992-1996, in: Der Donauraum vol. 36 (1996), no. 3-4, 
pp. 53-62; Stefan Troebst, Der Transnistrienkonflikt und seine Bearbeitung durch die OSZE, in: 
Österreichisches Studienzentrum für Frieden und Konfliktlösung/ÖSFK et al. (eds.): Afrikanische Perspek-
tiven: Theorie und Praxis ziviler Konfliktbearbeitung in Osteuropa, Ergebnisse der Internationalen State-of-
Peace-Konferenz 1997/bearb. von Catherine Schiemann Rittri, Chur/Zürich 1998, pp. 347-379; Rolf Wel-
berts, Der Einsatz der OSZE in der Republik Moldau, in: Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicher-
heitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg / IFSH (ed.), OSZE-Jahrbuch 1995, Baden-Baden, pp. 193-210. 
Consult also http://www.osce.org/moldova/background_information. 
8  Partidul Comunistilor din Republica Moldova – PCRM. 
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2. The 2001 Parliamentary Elections 
 
This is the third time elections of this kind have taken place in Moldova since the country 
declared independence on 27 August 1991. Like those in February 1994, these elections were 
early elections, leaving the parliamentary elections in March 1998 as the only ones that were 
regularly scheduled. In every parliament elected since 1990, parliamentary majorities have 
soon become minorities due to splits and re-shuffles, leading to frequent impasses and gov-
ernment crises. The Tarlev government elected on 19 April 2001 is the eighth government 
since Moldova declared independence and the fourth since 1998. The political instability re-
flected by these events was also responsible for the dissolution of the last Moldovan parlia-
ment in early 2001. 
 
Already in the 1998 parliamentary elections, the Party of Communists had become the strong-
est force in the Moldovan parliament holding 30 percent of the popular vote and 40 out of the 
101 seats. However, the Communists were sidelined by the non-communist factions, which 
formed a broad coalition called the Alliance for Democracy and Reforms (ADR)9. This coali-
tion united: 
· the Democratic Convention led by former President Mircea Snegur (Party of Rebirth and 
Conciliation – PRCM)10 including the pro-Romanian Christian Democratic Popular Front 
led by Iurie Rosca (19.42 percent – 26 seats),  
· the Bloc for a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova led by Dumitru Diakov, at that time a 
close ally of President Petru Lucinschi (18.16 percent – 24 seats) and 
· the Party of Democratic Forces (PFD)11 led by Valeriu Matei (8.84 percent – 11 seats). 
 
These parties divided the main posts in parliament and in the Ciubuc-II-government among 
themselves according to a 2-2-1 scheme, called the „algorithm“. Already in late 1998 the first 
signs of division became apparent within the Alliance for Democracy and Reforms and after 
Prime Minister Ion Ciubuc resigned in February 1999, it took the ADR several months to in-
stall Ion Sturza as the new Prime Minister. At that time, the Christian Democratic Popular 
Front – which had been renamed the Christian Democratic Popular Party (PPCD)12 in 1999 – 
left the Democratic Convention and the ADR, leaving this coalition with the narrowest possi-
ble majority of 52 votes13. Shortly thereafter, President Lucinschi announced a plan to trans-
form the mixed Moldovan parliamentary-presidential system into a presidential one. This idea 
was strongly opposed by most members of parliament and Parliamentary Speaker Diakov, 
whose party had strongly benefited from Lucinschi’s support in the 1998 elections, distanced 
himself from the President. As a result, some parliamentarians still close to the President de-
fected from the so-called Diakov-bloc, leaving the Sturza-government without a parliamen-
tary majority. In late 1999, Sturza had to resign and a new government under Dumitru Braghis 
was formed with the support of the Communists, the Popular Front and the pro-Lucinschi 
independents. 
  
The actual reason for the early elections in February 2001 was not due to a new government 
crisis, as one might have expected, but parliament's failure to elect a new president in Decem-
ber 2000. As a reaction to Lucinschi’s attempt to transform Moldova into a presidential re-
                                                                 
9  Alianþa pentru Democraþie si Reforme – ADR. 
10  Partidul Renasterii si Concilierii – PRCM. 
11  Partidul Forþelor Democratice – PFD. 
12  Partidul Popular Crestin Democrat – PPCD. 
13  According to a Decision of the Moldovan Constitutional Court, the absolute majority required by the 
Constitution for the formation of a government is defined as 52 votes. See Claus Neukirch, Judex non 
calculat?, in: WGO-Monatshefte für Osteuropäisches Recht 41 (1999), 1, p. 22. 
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public, the Moldovan parliament voted on 5 July 2000 with an overwhelming majority to elect 
future presidents through a vote of parliament. Moreover, the powers of the president were 
reduced whereas those of the government and the parliament were strengthened. The corre-
sponding changes to the Constitution and other related laws were supported by all the factions 
and deputies, except the independent deputies close to the president. In the following months, 
however, the parliamentary factions, which had experienced further splits and defections, 
were not able to agree on a common candidate for the presidency. Finally, the Communist 
leader Vladimir Voronin was nominated as candidate of his party, whereas the PFD, PRCM, 
PPCD and the Democratic Party (PDM)14 of Diakov supported the candidacy of the then 
Chairman of the Constitutional Court, Pavel Barbalat. Voronin managed to obtain 50 votes in 
the first and 59 votes in the second round, falling just two votes short of the required three-
fifths majority of 61 votes. Another attempt to hold a repeat election on December 21 failed 
because the centre and centre-right parties refused to participate as they feared an increased 
number of deputies would defect and vote for Voronin. As a result, President Lucinschi, after 
having consulted with the Constitutional Court, announced that he would dissolve the parlia-
ment in accordance with article 78 (5) of the Moldovan Constitution. The corresponding 
presidential decree, setting the date for early elections on 25 February, became effective on 12 
January. 
 
Between 12 January and 26 January the Central Election Commission (CEC) registered 12 
political parties, five electoral blocs, comprised of another 14 parties, as well as ten independ-
ent candidates. In total, out of the 31 parties registered with the Ministry of Justice, 26 partici-
pated in the elections with their own lists or as part of an electoral bloc. At least two others 
included their representatives on lists of other contestants without formally joining the re-
spective party or bloc.  
 
As the ten independent candidates had to surpass a 3 percent-threshold it had been regarded as 
highly unlikely, that any of them would gain seats in parliament. In fact, none of them even 
came close. The former PFD deputy Valeriu Ghiletchi managed best with 1.73 percent of the 
vote – three times as many votes as the remaining nine candidates put together, Ghiletchi ac-
tually obtained more votes than the party from which he defected (PFD: 1.22 percent). This 
would have been enough to earn him a seat in parliament, if independent candidates had not 
been required to reach a certain threshold. However, given the regulation in the Election 
Code, which foresees proportional elections in a nation-wide 101-member district, with a high 
threshold for the contestants, these votes have been lost. The 2001 elections, actually marked 
a new record in ’lost votes’ due to the new 6 percent-threshold for parties and electoral 
blocs15. Altogether 28.33 percent of the voters opted for electoral contestants who failed to 
achieve the threshold set for them. Only three formations managed to enter the parliament:  
 
· Vladimir Voronin' s Party of Communists earned 71 mandates with 50.07 percent of the 
vote; 
· the Braghis Alliance led by the then prime minister formed by several centre-left parties 
gained 13.36 percent and 19 mandates;  
· the Christian-Democratic Popular Party of Iurie Rosca obtained 8.24 percent and 11 man-
dates. 
 
The remaining parties of the 1998 government coalition, which remained together as a ’coali-
tion in opposition’ in 2000 were not popular among voters in 2001. Snegurs PRCM came 
quite close to joining the parliament with 5.79 percent, Diakov's Democratic Party obtained 
                                                                 
14  Partidul Democrat din Moldova – PDM. 
15  In 1994 and 1998 a 4%-threshold applied for all electoral contestants. 
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only 5.02 percent and Mateis PFD (1.22 percent) lost almost its entire electorate. Taken to-
gether the moderate right-wing political formations attained over a quarter of the votes. None 
of them, however, succeeded in entering parliament. Basically, the ADR experienced the 
same fate as the Agrarian Democratic Party (PDAM)16 in 1998: In the 1994 Elections the 
PDAM won 43.18 percent of the votes and 56 of the104 seats, in 1998, however, it gained 
less than 4 percent of the vote and failed to re-enter parliament.  
 
The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR) which had deployed an Election Observation 
Mission to Moldova has concluded that parliamentary elections on 25 February 2001 in the 
Republic of Moldova met international standards for democratic elections. Although 
OSCE/ODIHR did observe some shortcomings with regard to the accuracy of voter lists, the 
restrictive provisions of the media and the provisions on the status of contestants holding 
public offices, the overall tone of the OSCE/ODIHR Report is positive17. There can be no 
doubt that the victory of the Communists reflects the free will of the Moldovan people. This 
victory might have been even clearer, if the Transdniestrian authorities would have allowed 
the opening of polling stations on the left bank of the river. However, because they regard the 
Republic of Moldova as a ’foreign country‘ they dismissed the request of the Moldovan au-
thorities to open polling stations on Transdniestrian-controlled territory. As in earlier elec-
tions, special polling stations were set up in Moldovan-controlled villages and Transdniestrian 
residents were invited to come there to vote. Although the busses carrying Transdniestrian 
voters were not prevented from crossing – which occurred in 1996 and 1998 – Transdniestrian 
authorities discouraged participation in the elections through different means. As a result, 
only 4,265 of the roughly 400,000 Transdniestrians entitled to vote participated in the parlia-
mentary elections18.  
 
Three months after the 2001 elections, seven of the moderate right-wing parties19, represent-
ing 20.5 percent of the electorate, signed an agreement to build a new alliance called the De-
mocratic Forum20. If it had been formed before the elections, this alliance would have been 
the second strongest force in Moldovan parliament. As a result of their inability to overcome 
personal differences and jealousies early enough, the Moldovan parliament is now dominated 
by an overwhelmingly strong Communist faction, which might even be back on some issues 
by the centre-left Braghis Alliance, which described itself as ‘constructive opposition’. In 
contrast, the right-wing Christian Democratic Popular Party will be in fundamental opposition 
to the Communists. The PPCD which has a relatively stable electorate of seven to nine per-
cent, however, runs on a populist pro-Romanian platform and, thus, should like the Commu-
nists be regarded as a ’anti-system party’. The absence of a strong but moderate right-wing 
opposition, will thus be felt. 
 
One of the conclusions that has to be drawn from the recent elections is that the Moldovan 
voters have developed almost no party affiliation and are ready to vote any party or coalition 
                                                                 
16  Partidul Democrat Agrar din Moldova – PDAM. 
17  OSCE/ODIHR, Republic of Moldova – Parliamentary Elections, 25 February 2001. Final Report. Warsaw, 3 
April 2001. 
18  OSCE/ODIHR, Republic of Moldova – Parliamentary Elections, 25 February 2001. Final Report. Warsaw, 3 
April 2001, p.1118. 
19  PRCM (5.79%), PDM (5.02%), PFD (1.22%), National Peasants Christian Democratic Party (Partidul Na-
þional Þãranesc Crestin Democrat – PNÞCD, 1,74%), Social Democratic Party of Moldova (Partidul Social 
Democrat din Moldova - PSDM, 2,47%), National Liberal Party (Partidul Naþional Liberal – PNL, 2.81%), 
Social-Political Movement For Order and Justice (Miscarea Soical-Politcã Pentru Ordine si Dreptate – 
MSPOD, 1.46%). 
20  Infotag 22.5.2001, Seven Political Parties Merge into Democratic Forum. 
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who have failed to live up their promises out of power. Certain cleavages (pro-Western 
against pro-Russian, Unionist against Moldovanist etc.) must nevertheless be considered. A 
pro-Romanian intellectual or small peasant can hardly be expected to vote for the Commu-
nists and Russian-speaking pensioners would not vote for the PPCD. Following up on one 
previous observation, the subsequent conclusion must be drawn: The unstable party system 
itself allows for frequent splits and re-shuffles which can turn big majorities (86:18 in 199421 
and 61:40 in 1998) into minorities in a matter of a couple of weeks. Thus, the Communists 
should be warned by recent history and might try to preserve their well-known discipline and 
live-up to their election campaign promises. This, will not be an easy task at all. Before the 
future prospects of Communist rule in Moldova can be discussed, however, some explanation 
for the unexpected high victory of the Communists and the crushing defeat of the centre-right 
camp must be explained. To start with, a short outline of the Moldovan party systems seems 
in order. 
 
Generally speaking, most of the Moldovan political parties have their roots either in the for-
mer Communist Party of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, in the Popular Front or in 
the Unity (Edinstvo) movement, the latter two emerged in spring 1989. 
 
The Popular Front of Moldova was created as opposition to the conservative Moldovan 
Communists and its original aim was to support Glasnost and Perestroika in this Soviet Re-
public. However, the Popular Front became increasingly occupied with its Moldovan agenda 
and demanded, for instance, that Romanian become the state language of the Republic. After 
the ousting of Ceausescu, unification with Romania also became a desirable option for the 
Front. At the beginning of the 1990s the Popular Front Movement split into different political 
formations. Continuous splits, coalition shuffles and changes of denominations make it diffi-
cult to trace the route of these formations between 1994 and 2001. However, most centre-right 
formations have their roots here – Snegur‘s PRCM and Diakov’s PDM being the most im-
portant exceptions. In 1994, the main competitors on the right end of the political spectrum 
were the Popular Front and the Bloc of Peasants and Intellectuals. They received 7.53 percent 
and 9.21 percent respectively. Together with the smaller parties, the right-wing accounted for 
almost 25 percent of the total vote. In the 1995 local elections, which were boycotted by the 
Front, the more moderate Alliance for Democracy received 19.67 percent of the votes. In the 
1998 parliamentary Elections, the Front formed a coalition with Snegur’s Party for Rebirth 
and Conciliation. This coalition gained 19.42 percent of the popular vote and 26 seats – nine 
of them belonged to the Front. Other offspring of Popular Front Movement who ran in 1998 
were the Party of Democratic Forces, winning 8.84 percent of the vote and 11 mandates, and 
the Alliance of Democratic Forces which gained 2.24 percent. In 2001 the PPCD, the PFD 
and the PNL could be regarded as the main offspring of the Popular Front Movement, al-
though some of their former leading members have now joined other parties. Parties with 
strong roots in the Popular Front Movement accounted for almost 15 percent of the total in the 
2001 Elections, other centre-right parties with different roots gained another 10 percent. In 
1998 rightist parties, including Snegur’s PRCM, obtained around 30 percent of the vote. Thus, 
there seemed to be a pretty stable 25-30 percent strong centre-right electorate, which, how-
ever, has not developed a strong party affiliation. Due to the vote split and high threshold, the 
loss of mandates – from 37 to 11 – was much more dramatic for the right-wing parties than 
the loss of votes. 
 
 
                                                                 
21  Although it had a majority on his own, the PDAM formed a de-facto coalition with the left-wing Socialist-
Unity Bloc in 1994. 
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Table 1: Main Political Parties and Electoral Blocs in the Republic of Moldova 1994 –2001  
 
Sym-
bol 
Name of the Party or 
Bloc 
Election 
Results 
Party 
Chairman 
Roots 
 Party of Communists 
(Partidul Comunistilor din 
Republic Moldova – 
PCRM) 
1994: - 
1998: 30.01% 
2001: 50.07% 
 
Vladimir 
Voronin 
Communist 
Party of 
Moldova 
(Partidul 
Communist din 
Moldova – 
PCM) 
 Agrarian Democratic 
Party of Moldova 
(Partidul Agrar Democrat 
din Moldova – PDAM) 
1994: 43.18% 
1998:   3.63% 
2001:   1.16% 
Anatol 
Popusoi 
PCM 
 Party of Rebirth and 
Conciliation (Partidul 
Renasterii si Concilierii – 
PRCM) 
1994: - 
1998: 19.42%22 
2001:   5.79% 
Mircea 
Snegur 
PCM / PDAM 
 Democratic Party 
(Partidul Democrat din 
Moldova– PDM) 
1994: - 
1998: 18.16%23 
2001:   5.02% 
Dumitru 
Diakov 
PCM / PDAM / 
Democratic and 
Prosperous 
Moldova 
 Alliance for Braghis  
(Alianta Braghis) 
1994: - 
1998: -24 
2001: 13.36% 
Dumitru 
Braghis 
PCM / PDAM / 
Democratic and 
Prosperous 
Moldova 
 Unity  
(Edinstvo) 
1994: 22.00% 25 
1998:   1.83%26 
2001:   0.46% 
Valentin 
Krilov 
Edinstvo 
Movement / 
Socialist Unity 
Bloc 
 Christian Democratic 
Popular Party (Partidul 
Popular Crestin Democrat 
– PPCD) 
1994:   7.53%27 
1998:28 
2001:   8.24% 
Iurie  
Rosca 
Popular Front 
 Party of Democratic 
Forces (Partidul Fortelor 
Democratice – PFD) 
1994:   9.21 29 
1998:   8.84% 
2001:   1.22% 
Valeriu 
Matei 
Popular Front / 
Bloc of 
Peasants and 
Intellectuals  
 National Liberal Party 
(Partidul National Liberal 
– PNL) 
1994: 30 
1998:   2.24%31 
2001:   2.81% 
Mircea Rusu Popular Front / 
Bloc of 
Peasants and 
Intellectuals 
                                                                 
22  As Democratic Convention together with the Popular Front and several other smaller right wing parties. 
23  As Electoral Bloc For a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova together with smaller centre-left parties. 
24  Parties who entered the Braghis Alliance in 2001 received a total of 3.88% in 1998. 
25  As Socialist Unity Electoral Bloc. 
26  As Socialist Unity Electoral Bloc. 
27  As Alliance of the Popular Front. 
28  Received nine mandates as part of the Democratic Convention. 
29  Part of the Bloc of Peasants and Intellectuals. 
30  Part of the Bloc of Peasants and Intellectuals. 
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The Edinstvo movement has to be seen as a direct response by parts of the Russian-speaking 
population to the platform of the Popular Front in 1989. From the very beginning, Edinstvo 
fought against unification with Romania, was even wary of closer integration and stood for 
preserving Moldova's relationship with the Soviet Union and the status of Russian as the sec-
ond state language. In the absence of the Communist Party the Socialist Unity electoral bloc 
formed by Edinstvo and the Socialist Party received 22 percent of the votes in 1994. After the 
re-establishment of the Communist Party in 1995, the Socialists and the Edinstvo movement 
lost support continuously among the electorate. Former leaders of this movement are now 
members of the parties forming the Edinstvo electoral bloc, the Braghis Alliance and the Party 
of Communists. In 2001, the Edinstvo electoral bloc gained only 0.46 percent. Although pre-
cise studies do not exist, it is fair to argue that the majority of those people who voted for So-
cialist Unity in 1994 opted for the Communists in 1998 and 2001. 
 
The Party of Communists was established in 1995 and most closely resembles the Communist 
Party of Moldova (PCM)32, which was banned after the Moscow putsch in 1991. The Agrar-
ian Democratic Party, is another offspring of the PCM and was structured mainly by the 
younger Moldovan party nomenclature of the agrarian industrial complex which supported the 
bid for sovereignty and independence. It dominated Moldovan Politics between 1994 and 
1996 as a centre-left party. After the centre-right Party for Rebirth and Conciliation led by 
Mircea Snegur and the centre-left Bloc for a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova originally 
inspired by Lucinschi and now le by Dumitru Diakov had broken off from the PDAM, the 
rump-Agrarians moved further to the left and joined the Communists to form a coalition in the 
1999 local elections. The Diakov bloc itself experienced some divisions in 1999 and trans-
formed itself into a centre-right pro-market force. Whereas Snegur’s PRCM is stronger among 
Romanian speakers, the Democratic Party still appeals to Romanian and Russian speakers 
alike. The Braghis Alliance which was founded just prior to the 2001 elections also has for-
mer Communist Party and Komsomol activists in its ranks. It is more a centre-left than a cen-
trist force, filling the gap left by the Democratic Party. It not only has some convictions in 
common with the Communists, but also shares a part of the electorate. Both formations have a 
multi-ethnic electorate. However, the Communists polled stronger among Russian speakers, 
whereas the Braghis Alliance seemed to do better among Romanian speakers. In 2001 the 
Braghis Alliance (13.36 percent) was not able to get as strong as the Diakov bloc in 1998 
(18.21 percent). It seems the reason for this is twofold. First, although moving to the right, the 
Democratic Party, which itself gained 5 percent in 2001, was certainly able to hold on to some 
of its 1998 voters. Second, whereas closeness to President Lucinschi was an asset in 1998, it 
was a burden in 2001. According to an opinion poll published shortly before the elections 84 
percent of the population had trusted Lucinschi little or only very little33. 
 
During the election campaign, the Braghis Alliance was seen more as the party of the presi-
dent than that of the prime minister by most of the other contestants. Consequently, it was 
attacked by the parties of two other potential contestants for the presidency. Both Voronin’s 
PCRM and Snegur’s PRCM included this issue in their campaign by posing the question ‘Vo-
ronin or Lucinschi’ and respectively ‘Snegur or Lucinschi’. Another formation especially 
critical of the Braghis Alliance was the Democratic Party. Regarding itself as a centre force 
like the Alliance, the PDM competed partly for the same voters, especially in the countryside. 
Moreover, the party of former Prime Minister Sturza questioned the alleged successes of the 
Braghis government. Only the parties of the former Alliance for Democracy and Reforms – 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
31  Part of the Alliance of Democratic Forces. 
32  Partidul Communist din Moldova – PCM. 
33  CSOP – Centrul pentru Studierea Opiniei si Pietei, Barometrul de opinie publicã, Republica Moldova, 
ianuarie 2001. 
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PDM, PRCM and PFD – did not attack one another. They concentrated their negative cam-
paign against the forces which replaced the Sturza-government with the Braghis government: 
Voronin (PCRM), Lucinschi (Braghis) and Rosca (PPCD). These parliamentary and former 
government parties on the centre-right were attacked not only by the Communists and the 
Braghis Alliance, but also by the extra-parliamentary National Liberal Party and other centre-
right formations not represented in the former parliament. 
 
Overall the election campaign was characterised by aggressive negative campaigning, di-
rected in most cases at the political formations competing for the same voters. This was espe-
cially devastating for the centre-right parties, while the Communists, strong force on the left, 
were able to consolidate their electorate. To a certain extent, the PPCD, was able to do the 
same on the right end of the political spectrum. It was, however, not able to gain many more 
votes from centre-right voters than in 1994 and 1998. The Braghis Alliance, finally, attracted 
less centre-left voters than one might have expected. The moderate successes of the Braghis 
government were not sufficient to convince voters to abandon the idea of entrusting the 
Communist Party with ruling the country. The Communists had conducted a low-key but ef-
fective door-to-door campaign and had used Soviet nostalgia and populist promises as was the 
case in 1998. This time, however, they did not just gain the confidence of the voters who had 
defected from the Socialist Unity bloc or who had lost trust in the Agrarians. In 2001, their 
electorate was filled up by disappointed voters of Lucinschi and the Diakov bloc and probably 
even some industrial or agricultural workers who had voted for the Snegur before. There is a 
stable left wing electorate of 20 - 30 percent in Moldova anyway, but the decisive factors 
playing into the hands of the Communists in 2001 were the appalling state of the Moldovan 
economy and the incapability of previous governments to conduct effective reforms34.  
 
 
3. The Aftermath of the Elections: A Communist President and a Technocrat Government 
 
After some days of confusion, provoked by the unexpected height of their victory, the Com-
munists put everything on track for a fast and smooth change of power. On 3 March, the 
PCRM leader, Vladimir Voronin, announced his candidacy for the presidency and the same 
day, the president designate stated that he would form a technocrat government under a non-
Communist prime minister35.  
 
First of all, however, the leadership posts in the parliament had to be divided up among the 
various parties. On 20 March, Eugenia Ostapciuc (PCRM) was elected Speaker of Parliament, 
while Vadim Mishin (PCRM) and Mihai Camerzan (Braghis Alliance) were elected her 
deputies36. By electing Eugenia Ostapciuc Speaker and Vadim Mishin only as her deputy, the 
Communists have at least indirectly conceded that one has to speak fluent Moldovan today in 
order to be elected to the highest offices. The chairmanships in the ten standing committees 
were divided up according to the strength of each faction, resulting in the domination of the 
Communists: The PCRM will head seven committees, the Braghis Alliance two and the 
PPCD one. Thus, formally all posts in the parliament and in the parliamentary delegations to 
other bodies have been distributed legitimately. However, by electing Mihai Camerzan as 
                                                                 
34  For more explanations see also Leonid Cernei, Republik Moldova: Die Wahlen sind vorbei, aber Wahlen 
gibt es immer wieder, in: Rissener Rundbrief 4-5/2001, pp.35-40. 
35  Basa-Press 03.03.2001, Communists Decide to Name Voronin as Candidate to Presidency, Vladimir 
Voronin Says He Wants a Non-Communist Premier and a Technocrat Government. 
36  Basa-Press 20.03.2001, Vadim Misin and Mihail Camerzan are Elected Deputy Speakers.  
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second deputy without the consent of his faction, the Communists also made clear that they 
set the rules in this new parliament37. 
 
On 4 April 2001 the next step in the Communist resumption of power followed. Vladimir 
Voronin was elected President of the Republic of Moldova. Voronin was given, as expected, 
71 votes while former Prime-Minister Dumitru Braghis was given the support of only 15 
deputies. To make sure, that these elections were in conformity with the idea of ’democratic 
choice’“, even if Braghis had withdrawn at the last minute, the Communists would have pro-
posed a second candidate, Valerian Cristea. Cristea was backed by three deputies, who most 
probably came from the Braghis Alliances as the PPCD had decided not to take part in the 
presidential elections38. 
 
Although the constitutional reform of 5 July 2000 had reduced the powers of the president in 
some areas, it was not as radical as one might have expected while observing the discussions 
prior to the parliamentary decision39. Only the right to attend government sessions, to consult 
with the government on issues of special importance and to appoint two judges to constitu-
tional court were taken away from the presidency. The stipulations regarding the nomination 
of the government were not changed in substance, but only transferred from the section on the 
presidency to the section on the government. Thus, it is still the president who, after consulta-
tions with the parliamentary factions, appoints the prime minister, who then has to seek a vote 
of confidence for his ministers and his programme in the parliament. Laws must also still to 
be promulgated by the president, who has the right to send them back to the parliament for 
reconsideration. He is also entitled to issue decrees. Thus, the position of the Moldovan presi-
dent is still quite strong, all the more so, as the newly elected head of state is at the same time 
the leader of the party that holds the majority in the parliament. Whereas Lucinschi was 
backed by only five deputies in his last year of office, Voronin can count on a 71-strong 
Communist faction. Moreover, Voronin was re-elected Party Chairman of the PCRM on 22 
April40. In leading his party and the PCRM faction, Voronin will be supported by Victor 
Stepaniuk who was elected leader of the Communist faction and Secretary of the Political 
Executive Committee41. Considering that all major decisions within the PCRM are taken by 
the Central Committee, Voronin, with the support of Stepaniuk, might very well be able to 
order ‘his’ faction via the Central Committee on how to vote. Given the fact that the post of 
parliamentary speaker was given to a relative weak ’compromise candidate’ instead to one of 
the strong figures within the Communist faction, Voronin might control parliament in a way 
neither Snegur nor Lucinschi could have ever dreamed of. Thus, less than a year after the in-
troduction of a ’parliamentary’ system, the new president has emerged as the most powerful 
political player in Moldova. Voronins strong position was indirectly confirmed by (then 
nominated) Prime-Minister Tarlev, who stated that the list of ministers had to be agreed upon 
with the president42. The Moldovan Constitution does not foresee anything like this, however, 
it also does not rule it out.  
 
Voronin designated a 37 year old factory manager, Vasile Tarlev as Prime Minister on 11 
April. On 19 April, the parliament approved his cabinet and his programme. As Voronin 
                                                                 
37  Infotag 22.03.2001, Deputy Speaker Camerzan Not Expelled from His Faction. 
38  Reuters 04.04.2001, Communists Elected New Moldovan President; Basa-Press 04.04.2001: Communists 
Elected New Moldovan President.  
39  See Claus Neukirch, Moldau: Eine Zwischenbilanz zur Umgestaltung des moldauischen Regierungssystems, 
in: WGO- Monatshefte für Osteuropäisches Recht 42 (2000), 4, [forthcoming]. 
40  Infotag 24.04.2001, Moldova's Communists Leadership Believes in Perspectives of Communism. 
41  Infotag 24.04.2001, President Voronin Re-elected as Moldovan Communist Party Chief.  
42  Infotag 16.04.2001, Tarlev Going to Propose New People to Government. 
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pointed out right after the elections, the change of power in Moldova has not been as funda-
mental as the election results of 25 February might have indicated. 
 
One has to remember that the Braghis government was formed in December 1999 with the 
support of the Communist votes and, thus, already included three Communist ministers. 
Moreover, the quite unexpected change in the Foreign Ministry from Nicolae Tabacaru to 
Nicolae Cernomaz in autumn 2000 was most probably Voronin's initiative. Not surprisingly, 
Cernomaz kept the post of Foreign Minister in the Tarlev government. In addition to his re-
appointed, the Ministers of Finance, (Mihai Manoli), Economics (Andrei Cucu, also Deputy 
Prime Minister), Education (Ilie Vancea) and Energy (Ion Lesanu) as well as the one of 
Labour and Social Protection (Valerian Revenco) were re-appointed. The Minister of Defence 
(Victor Gaiciuc) is also no new face – he served as deputy minister under his predecessor 
Boris Garumai. Out of those mentioned only Vancea is a member of the PCRM. He is joined 
in the new government by only two of his party comrades: the Deputy Prime Ministers 
Valerian Cristea and Dumitru Todoroglo – the latter being also responsible for Agriculture 
and Food Processing Industry. The remaining Ministers are either non-party affiliated43 or are 
even members of the ’constructive opposition’: Justice Minister Ion Morei heads the Centrist 
Union of Moldova and was elected to parliament on the list of the Braghis Alliance. The 
Minister of the Environment, Gheorghe Duca, ran on the same list. Like Cernomaz, both have 
been close allies of Lucinschi in the last years. The new Minister of the Interior, Vasile 
Draganel, was Chief of Lucinschi's Presidential Security Service before. As for the Prime 
Minister himself, he was said to have been considered for this post by then President 
Lucinschi in February 199944. Thus, judged by its personalities the Tarlev-government can 
hardly be described as ‘new’ or ’Communist’. It contains elements of continuity and includes 
only three Communists, albeit in important positions. Thus, the Tarlev government can be 
labelled as ‘Communist-controlled’.  
 
This continuity, should not catch anyone by surprise. Recently, Paul Goble, argued that peo-
ple would understand why many members of former nomenclature structures have continued 
in power far better, albeit without the ideological verbiage of communism, if they considered 
Milovan Djilas theory on the ’new class’. Goble states that in Djilas's study published back in 
1957, he argued, ’that the communist regimes had degenerated from an ideologically com-
mitted elite into a group of greedy individuals concerned only about their own privileges and 
status’ 45. Members of this ‘new class’ were not burdened with ideological ’ballast’ and, thus, 
were able to readjust to the new environment of the early 1990s. This is exactly what hap-
pened to Moldova, which experienced the rule of former CC-PCM Secretary Mircea Snegur 
(1991 - 1996) and former member of the CPSU Politburo member Petru Lucinschi (1996 - 
2001). Also most of the other politicians who filled high posts in Moldova after independence 
had gained sufficient experience in the MSSR’s Komsomol and party structure before. Thus, 
with the exception of the Popular Front governments of 1991/92, the Republic of Moldova 
has been basically ruled by ’New Class Communists’, who have only changed their labels and 
symbols. For most of these functionaries ’fruitful collaboration’ with the Communists Party, – 
which still uses the old label and much of the old ideological slogans – poses no problem at 
all.  
 
As far as the Communists are concerned, they had good reason to include non-communists 
experts into the government. First of all, the PCRM has so far not been regarded as a reservoir 
                                                                 
43  In addition to those mentioned above, this held true for the Ministers of Culture (Ion Pãcuraru), Transport 
and Communication (Victor Þopa), Industry (Mihail Garstea) and Health (Andrei Gherman). 
44  Infotag 11.04.2001, Premier-Designate is Trustworthy, Says Voronin. 
45  Paul Goble, The Legacy of Milovan Djilas, in: RFE/RL Balkan Report Vol. 5, No. 30, 24.04. 2001. 
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of well-qualified and highly educated experts. The Communists were required to fill 71 seats 
in parliament, including more than ten leading posts which required a certain amount of ex-
pertise. At the end of the day, they simply ran out of able candidates for government posts. 
Secondly, the inclusion of non-Communist experts, especially in the fields of economics and 
finance, was necessary in order to soften the reaction of Western countries and international 
financial institutions after the Communist victory. Finally, having all the power in their hands 
but still only limited remedies to overcome the socio-economic crises, the Communists also 
have kept open a strategic option. They may be able to use the non-Communist, technocratic 
Tarlev government as scape-goat if things do not take a turn for the better in the near future. 
 
Thus, the inclusion of former government members and close allies of Lucinschi in the Tarlev 
government served the interests of the PCRM leadership as well as those of the people ap-
pointed to the government. However, it is not the label that is important, but the content. The 
question is, what kind of policy can be expected? What will its impact be on democracy and 
market reforms in Moldova and on the Transdniestrian conflict? And which direction will 
Moldova take? Contradictory statements and an unclear policy concept make it hard for po-
litical observers to forecast the future activities of the new leadership and the fact that the of-
ficial website of the Moldovan government still features the Braghis government programme 
from December 199946 does not make this task any easier.  
 
 
4. Democracy and Market Reforms under Communist Rule 
 
Judged after their first two months in office, President Voronin and his Tarlev-government do 
not seem to be endangering democracy and market reform in Moldova. The state of democ-
racy in Moldova might be affected most by the domination of the parliament by an over-
whelmingly strong Communist faction, which is directed mainly by its party and not by its 
voters. This should, however, not affect the political system in Moldova in the long run. What 
might affect the country more, is the not so unexpected fact that the new leadership has done 
next to nothing to speed up reforms in the country. 
 
After the parliamentary elections, major changes were expected most of all in economic and 
social policy and also in the field of inter-ethnic relations. Giving the Russian language the 
status of a second state language and offering courses entitled the ‘Moldovan Language’ and 
‘Moldovan History’ in schools and universities were some of the campaign promises of the 
Communists directed especially towards the non-Moldovan voters. Language politics have 
been a sensitive issue in Moldova since the late 80s and some of the plans raised by the 
Communists in this field47 might provoke new conflicts within Moldovan society. In March 
and April 1995 Chisinau experienced several weeks of wide-spread student protests after the 
government had announced plans to change the names of the courses entitled the ’History of 
the Romanians’ and the ’Romanian language’ to ’Moldovan History’ and the ’Moldovan 
Language’. As a matter of fact, article 13 of the Constitution defines the state language ex-
plicitly as ’Moldovan’, but in the early 1990s the term ’Romanian’ was widely used – espe-
cially in education. Thus, severe resistance from students and teachers as well as from the 
staff of the Education Ministry might occur, if these questions are put on the agenda again48. 
As a matter of fact, initial protests were already staged after President Voronin had instructed 
                                                                 
46  http://www.moldova.md/ro/government/index.html as of June 25, 2001. 
47  Basa-Press 31.03.2001, Vladimir Dragomir: We Must Respect Constitution on Linguistic Issue. 
48  Infotag 13.04.2001, Ministry Against Russian Language Exams.  
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the government to prepare new manuals on the ’History of Moldova’ as a replacement for the 
currently used manuals entitled a ’History of Romanians’49.  
 
As far as the question of Russian as a second state language is concerned, the Communists 
have indicated that they will hold a referendum on this issue. If the Communists do imple-
ment a referendum, they would most probably stir up another public debate on language is-
sues – this might even be positive if the discussions are then conducted in a calm and con-
structive manner. Nevertheless, it is highly questionable if a referendum would succeed. Put-
ting these delicate issues to a referendum might just be a clever way for the Communists to 
avoid implementing a critical part of their electoral programme. Instead of declaring Russian 
the second state language, the Communists will be seen as raising the overall status of the 
Russian language. Russian already has a legal basis as a language of inter-ethnic communica-
tion, which makes it an official language. The new Law on Acts of Civil Status, for example, 
stipulates that documents, inter alia, birth, marriage, and death certificates be drawn up in the 
state and in the Russian languages50. Russian will probably be used more and more frequently 
in official documents and official communication. At the same time, high-ranking Commu-
nists have made it clear that they expect the Russian-speaking population to learn the state 
language and thus, to establish symmetric Russian/Moldovan bilingualism in the country. The 
new government can be sure that international organisations like the OSCE and UNDP will 
support this goal which can be reached only through long-term programmes first aimed at 
effective Moldovan and Russian lessons in school and on special Moldovan courses for the 
adult population. This kind of policy might still provoke some opposition from pro-Romanian 
as well as pro-Russian extremists, but it would most probably find the support of the majority 
of the population which is much more pragmatic on language issues. Thus, this kind of devel-
opment would actually foster inter-ethnic peace in the country and would help to safeguard 
the rights of minorities.  
 
The most pressing questions for Moldova and its international partners are, however, less 
connected to the country’s record in human rights and democracy – which, judged by the 
standards within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), is quite positive – but di-
rected more towards economic problems. In its electoral platform the Communist Party de-
clared that it would strive for equality of rights for all forms of property. After the elections, 
the principle of respect for private property was reiterated numerous times. On the other hand, 
the PCRM, inter alia, emphasized the significance of the state property in economic branches 
of strategic importance and called for the protection of local producers as well as price con-
trols on several products, including energy51. The privatisation of the wine and tobacco indus-
try, envisaged by the Braghis government in October 2000, failed also because of the reluc-
tance of the PCRM to go ahead with it. Although Prime Minister Tarlev announced that the 
privatisation of these enterprises would occur ’soon’52 no concrete steps have been taken in 
this regard. It, thus, seems that the forces within the PCRM that oppose the privatisation of 
wine and tobacco industry are stronger than the Prime Minister. Moreover, the Communist 
faction voted in early May to increase compensation for war veterans by 60 million lei, al-
though this amount was not included in the 2001 budget and although some holes in the 
budget already exist. The 2001 budget is already suffering from a 1.5 billion lei shortage: The 
delay in the privatisation of the electricity distribution networks RED North and RED North-
West created a 151 million lei gap, while the decisions to increase the credit to the Individual 
                                                                 
49  Basa-Press 08.06.2001, Communists Announce Plan to Write new History Book for Moldova. 
50  Infotag 26.04.2001, Acts of Civil Status Shall be Necessarily Drawn up in Two Languages. 
51  Infotag 07.04.2001, Voronin Announces Intention to Raise Role of State. 
52  Basa-economic 03.05.2001, Premier Tarlev: Privatisation of Wine and Tobacco Enterprises to Start in 
“Nearest Future”.  
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Farms Fund by 60 million lei, the 20 percent increase in wages by March 1, and the 10 per-
cent increase in pensions by July 1 raised expenses by 430 million lei. Finally, the European 
Union and the World Bank suspended the repayment of debts totalling 36.6 million US-Dol-
lar53. 
 
The failure to conclude the privatisation processes in the energy, telecom, wine and tobacco 
industries cannot be blamed entirely on the Tarlev government. However, in the past, it has 
always been the Communists who have opposed these privatisation projects and they did 
nothing to speed them up after the February elections. The future of agricultural reform is also 
a big question mark in Moldova. The Communists have opposed the privatisation process in 
the agricultural sector in the past years and continued their criticism after the elections. 
Vladimir Voronin had qualified the ’Pamânt’ (’Land’) privatisation programme implemented 
with the support of the US government as ’destructive’54 and Parliamentary Speaker Eugenia 
Ostapciuc hinted in a recent speech that her party intends to revise the agrarian reform course 
and to introduce some corrections at the reform's post-privatisation stage55. By appointing a 
declared opponent of ’Pamânt’ Dumitru Todorolgo, as Minister of Agriculture56 the above-
mentioned question mark has become even more inflated.  
 
Thus, although Voronin and other leading Communists have declared their willingness to 
continue key economic reforms, to re-vitalise the production process, to fight corruption and 
to fulfil international commitments57, doubts within the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
that Moldova will stay on course have emerged. The slow-down of the privatisation process, 
the increase in spending as well as plans to introduce price controls finally caused the IMF to 
suspend its financial assistance to Moldova58. As a result, Moldova will, for now, not receive 
the third portion of the 142 million dollar loan, approved on December 21, 200059 under the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) programme. The IMF made it plain that fi-
nancial assistance would only be resumed if the country sticks closely to the memorandum 
signed between the IMF and the Braghis government in November 2000. According to the 
IMF the programme of the new government contains provisions that may be inconsistent with 
this memorandum60, and a final decision whether or not to continue giving credits to Moldova 
will only be taken after some clarity has been reached on the concrete policy of the new ad-
ministration. According to the IMF, the Moldovans should consult with them on future in-
creases in budgetary expenses in advance61. Moreover, the IMF objects to the government's 
intention to impose controls over prices on some primary commodities and to introduce new 
trade restrictions aimed at protecting local consumers. It also disapproved of the introduction 
of state orders for agricultural products and the plan to issue preferential credits to agricultural 
enterprises. The IMF also indicated the need to appoint an advisory bank for privatising the 
national telephone operator Moldtelecom as soon as possible. This bank should not just pro-
                                                                 
53  Chisinau Observer 17.05.2001, Economics - IMF Upset at Communists' Plans by Liudmila Zlotnikova. 
54  AP Flux 24.04.2001, Vladimir Voronin: “Certain Political Forces Want to Transform the Federal Republic 
of Moldova into a Romanian Province”. 
55  Infotag 02.04.2001, Communists Intend to Revise Some Essential Laws... . 
56  See Basa-general 31.03.2001, Dmitri Todoroglo: Serious Violations Were Committed in Land Program 
“Pamant”, Interview with Communist Deputy Dmitri Todoroglo, Chairman of the Parliamentary Commis -
sion for Agriculture and Processing Industry. 
57  Infotag 19.03.2001, World Bank Hopes for Partnership Continuation; Basa-general 31.03.2001, Nikolai 
Bondarchiuk: We Shall Coordinate Fiscal Policies with Buisnessmen. 
58  Itar-Tass via COMTEX 14.052001, IMF Suspends Financial Assistance to Moldova. 
59  See http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa.pdf as of 25 June 2001. 
60  Basa-economic 11.05.2001, Relations of Moldova with IMF are at a Critical Juncture, Considers IMF 
Representative in Chisinau.  
61  Moldpres 11.05.01, IMF Requests to be Consulted by Chisinau Cabinet for Adoption of Decisions on Rise 
in Budgetary Expenses. 
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vide consulting services, but act in an advisory capacity that would be acceptable to the World 
Bank. The IMF also emphasized the need to continue the privatisation of the wine and to-
bacco sectors, which is contrary to the government's intention to create state-run monopolies 
out of the wineries and tobacco fermentation factories in question. The IMF has made clear 
that privatisation of the two electricity distribution networks RED North and RED North West 
should be conducted in a competitive, transparent manner – and for cash. Moreover the IMF 
has made demands that a package of laws be submitted to parliament on pre-shipment inspec-
tion, on section 5 of the Tax Code ’Tax Administering’, on free economic zones as well as 
amendments to the law on financial institutions62. 
 
These IMF requirements seriously challenge certain PCRM views on the social and economic 
sector. As will be argued below, they can hardly be dismissed. The country desperately needs 
the IMF support in order to stabilise its currency and restructure its debts. In April, Moldova's 
foreign debt increased by 2.9 million US-Dollar63, reaching 779 million US-Dollar. Addition-
ally the country owes 827 million US-Dollar to Gazprom for gas deliveries. Moldova's do-
mestic debt remains at 150 million US-Dollar64. Servicing the foreign debts alone will take up 
to 81.3 million US-Dollar or 37 percent of the budget revenues this year and in 2002 another 
178 million US-Dollar will have to be paid back, an amount equal to half of the budget65. In 
addition to the final suspension of IMF loans, other foreign crediting agencies may also sus-
pend their loans so that by the end of the year Moldova may end up receiving no foreign 
funding at all66. In this case the Moldovan budget would have to be cut back drastically and it 
would be even more difficult to find the money to finance pension increases, salaries and 
compensation or to spend more money on health and education as the Communists had 
promised before the elections. Moreover, an agreement with the IMF will be a condition for 
an agreement with the Club of Paris on the restructuring of debts, something the country des-
perately needs as it will hardly be able to spend 50 percent of its budget revenues on debt ser-
vicing next year. Thus, the Moldovan government does not have much choice. It either ac-
cepts the rules of the game made by the lenders and restructures its debts or declares a de-
fault.67 Accepting the rules, however, means that the Communists have to distance themselves 
from their electoral platform and that the government has to rewrite its activity programme. In 
other words, although the Communists have formally all the power in their hands in Moldova, 
they will not be able to conduct ‘their policy’ as they originally wished. The burden of finding 
a solution to this dilemma is primarily on President Voronin who used to talk quite differently 
to foreign and Moldovan audiences in the past weeks. Now that the IMF has called the bluff, 
Voronin will have to make decisions. This pressure went up even further after the Fitch inter-
national rating agency reacted to the IMF decision by downgrading the long-term foreign cur-
rency rating of the country from B- to CCC+68. This decision will make it even harder for 
Moldova to receive much needed foreign capital.  
 
Although President Voronin voiced harsh critique of the IMF and the World Bank and even 
asked them to cover a part of the Moldovan foreign debt69, the Moldovan leadership seemes 
to have understood the message. In the weeks following the IMF decision, a commission for 
the privatisation of the wine and tobacco enterprises was established, the electricity distribu-
                                                                 
62  Chisinau Observer 17.05.2001, Economics - IMF Upset at Communists' Plans by Liudmila Zlotnikova. 
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tion networks of northern Moldova were again put up for auction towards privatisation70 and 
the Austrian Raiffeisen Investment bank was chosen as a consultant to deal with the privati-
sation of Moldtelecom71.  
 
Given Moldova's recent admittance to the World Trade Organization (WTO)72 not everything 
is actually doomed to failure in Moldova. The ratification of WTO membership in the Moldo-
van parliament was a difficult task, but Voronin succeeded in calling his comrades to order. 
The fact that Moldova joined the WTO without delay even after the Communist victory was a 
positive sign. WTO membership will further restrict the government's ability to introduce 
trade regulations and, thus, will give additional incentives to comply with IMF rules. Not fol-
lowing the strict course the IMF has taken, the World Bank, has confirmed its intention to 
continue co-operation with Moldova and has just recently allocated 30 million US-Dollar for 
the ’Rural Investment and Services Project’ (RISP)73. Further projects are in the pipeline. 
They include a project in the energy sector for the rehabilitation of the infrastructure of the 
power system and for improvements in heat supply and consumption, a ’Market Access and 
Rural Services (MARS) Project’. The European Commission was also more moderate with 
the new government than the IMF and promised a 3.2 million US-Dollar grant for the devel-
opment of small and medium-size businesses74. Financing for infrastructure programs which 
have a regional impact might also come from the Stability Pact, which the country became a 
part of on 28 June 200175. 
 
Thus, the message from Western states and organisations was quite obvious in the past weeks. 
Co-operate and play according to our rules, than we might help you. Otherwise stick to your 
ideas and declare a default. The United States is also playing to this tune. During his visit to 
the US, Moldovan Foreign Minister Cernomaz was told by USAID that further technical as-
sistance were conditional upon the continuation of socio-economic reforms, while the US 
Treasury agreed to assist Moldova in restructuring its foreign debt by delegating an expert 
who is to help the Moldovan government to work out a strategy for resolving the debt prob-
lem – on the condition that Moldova comes to an agreement with the IMF76. 
 
Given the poor state of the Moldovan economy after ten years of half-hearted reforms – which 
were almost stopped altogether after 1995 – and growing corruption, Voronin and his Com-
munist Party seem to have little choice. Default and international isolation may lead directly 
to a ’Bulgarian scenario’. The more so as the Popular Front and the extra-parliamentary oppo-
sition of the moderate right are already waiting for the chance to combine social protests with 
national slogans in order to bring the Communists down. On the other hand, the Communists 
may disappoint their own electorate if they abandon their electoral promises – a course 
Moldovan voters sanctioned quite severely in the last elections. One possible way out for 
Voronin would be to adhere to the rules set by the lenders, but at the same time put all the 
blame on them. The recent combination of events in words and deeds indicates such a strategy 
would be shrewd and Voronin might be pragmatic enough to pursue this policy and strong 
enough to keep his own party in check. Thus, the chances that reforms will continue in 
Moldova have decreased less than one might have expected at first glance after February 25. 
 
                                                                 
70  Infotag 19.06.2001, Northern Electricity Distribution Enterprises Put Up for Privatization Auction again. 
71  Infotag 21.06.2001, Raiffeisen Investment Bank to Consult Government in Privatizing Moldtelecom. 
72  Infotag 10.05.2001, Accession to WTO to Catalyze Economic Reforms in Moldova, Premier Says. 
73  Infotag 05.05.2001, World Bank to Allocate $30 Million for Rural Investment and Services Project. 
74  Infotag 10.05.2001, Moldova to Receive $3.2 Million Grant. 
75  Basa-Press 29.06.2001, Republica Moldova a devenit membru cu drepturi depline a Pactului de Stabilitate 
pentru Europa de Sud-Est. 
76  Infotag 20.06.2001, U.S.A. to Help Moldova Restructure its Foreign Debts. 
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5. Foreign Policy 
 
One of the main questions raised by Western and Moldovan observers after 25 February, dealt 
with the future foreign orientation of the republic. The influential German newspaper ’Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung‘ even stated that Moldova would break off relations entirely with 
the West, including Romania, and would develop closer ties to the Russian Federation in-
stead77. Such fears seem to be exaggerated although certain shifts in Moldova's orientations 
can hardly be denied after parliament and presidency have fallen into the hands of the pro-
Russian Communist Party. 
 
The single most important player in Moldovan foreign policy is the head of state. According 
to article 86 of the Moldovan Constitution the president is entitled to take part in negotiations 
and to sign international treaties. Moreover, he appoints and recalls the heads of Moldova's 
diplomatic Missions. Although not mentioned in the constitution, by virtue of his office he 
sets the main foreign policy course. The foreign ministers in Moldova have traditionally been 
close to the president, in some cases even closer than to the prime minister. This also holds 
true for the re-appointed Foreign Minister, Nicolae Cernomaz, who has not only been a close 
ally of President Lucinschi, but also a person trusted by the Communist leader. The sudden 
replacement of pro-Western Nicolae Tabacaru by Cernomaz in autumn 2000 was mainly due 
to Communist pressure. Cernomaz could be regarded as the Moldovan Foreign Minister most 
oriented towards the East since the country gained independence, and he seems readily pre-
pared to implement Voronin's foreign policy concept, which embraces a stronger orientation 
towards Russia as Moldova's strategic partner without breaking ties with Romania and the 
Western European countries. 
 
Not surprisingly, Voronin's first foreign visit as Head of State led him to Moscow, were he 
underlined that, ‘the Russian Federation was, is and will be Moldova's strategic partner’78. 
Immediately after the parliamentary elections and again in his inauguration speech, however, 
Voronin also stressed that in principle he does not plan to change the foreign policy course of 
his country79. Although Russia has been named a ‘strategic partner’ of the Republic of 
Moldova, ties with Romania, Ukraine and the European Union (EU) have not been cut or re-
duced by the new administration. Visits to Bucharest (30 April - 1 May) and Kiev (18 May) 
were next on Voronin's agenda and Prime Minister Tarlev went of to Brussels for the EU-
Moldova Co-ordination Council on 15 May. The CIS summit in Minsk (31 May), the 
GUUAM summit in Yalta (June 6 - 7), the meeting of the heads of state of the Central Euro-
pean Initiative in Milan (June 8 - 9) and a visit to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg and to 
the EU in Brussels (June 26 - 28) in connection with Moldova's adherence to the Stability 
Pact completed Voronin's first round of visits abroad, while Foreign Minister Nicolae 
Cernomaz paid a visit to Washington from June 18 - 22. 
 
The diversity of these visits and the statements made in their framework indicate, that 
Voronin does not intend to tie himself and his country entirely to Russia. Although Moldova 
has been admitted as an observer to the Russian-Belarusian Union80 its full adherence to this 
union does not seem to be a priority. At least this question was not even discussed with Putin 
and Lukashenko during the CIS summit81. The Communist electoral platform stated only that 
                                                                 
77  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 05.04.2001, Kommunist neuer Präsident von Moldova.  
78  Infotag 16.04.2001, “Russia Was, Is and Will be Moldova's Strategic Partner”, Voronin Says. 
79  Basa-Press 03.03.2001, Communist Leader Says There Will be “a Continuation” in Moldova's Foreign Pol-
icy. 
80  Infotag 06.06.2001, Moldova Admitted as Observer to Russia-Belarus Union in Minsk. 
81  Basa-press 02.06.2001, Voronin did not Discuss Moldova's Accession to Russia-Belarus Union in Minsk.  
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this question would be considered, and might indeed lead nowhere as the idea now is to put 
the issue up for a referendum. Given that most Romanian speakers do not favour joining the 
union, basically, an electoral promise directed to the Russian-speaking electorate would be 
buried in an overly clever manner . 
 
This notwithstanding, the relationship with Russia is bound to become closer. The Moldovan 
government demonstrated that it intends to maintain good relations by modifying its memo, 
presented to the European Court for Human Rights in October 2000 in the hearing on the 
Ilascu-case, in a way that it should now prove that Russian Federation was not guilty of vio-
lating human rights in the Transdniestrian region82. The agreement for military co-operation, 
concluded in 1997, has been ratified by the Moldovan parliament83 and, according Russian 
officials, the drafting of the Basic Political Treaty between Moldova and Russia has entered 
its final stage84. 
 
During his visit to Moscow from 16 – 18 April, Voronin declared that his main task will be to 
overcome the socio-economic crisis in Moldova which is the poorest nation in Europe and 
that it is from Russia that he expects to receive the assistance in fulfilling this task. Russia 
delivers gas and energy to Moldova, is Moldova’s most important export market and Russian 
companies like Itera and Lukoil have become also important economic players in 
Moldova.The opening of a Moldovan trade residency in Moscow and a possible reduction of 
gas tariffs would certainly be of great help for Moldova85. However, Moldova-made ethanol, 
vodka, tobacco goods and sugar have been excluded from the of free trade regime with Rus-
sia86 signed a couple of weeks after Voronin's visit and deficiencies in the energy situation are 
still threatening. Moreover, Russia, although it is Moldova’s biggest creditor87, has very little 
means to help Moldova in solving its foreign debt problem. Thus, Voronin might not get the 
economic support from Russia he might have hoped for and whether Russia will really help 
the Moldovan President to solve the Transdniestrian conflict has also become questionable 
(see section on Transdniestria further below). Thus, Voronin's statement that the priorities of 
the Republic of Moldova in the field of foreign policy must be exclusively determined by 
economics88, might also be seen as justification for pragmatic ties with Romania and the 
European Union as well as with Ukraine. 
 
When looking at Moldova's relationship to Ukraine, one must also make reference to the 
GUUAM – comprising Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova. The 
GUUAM, was once perceived as an attempt to balance the Russian influence in the region. 
The four, after Uzbekistans entrance in 1999 five, states co-ordinated, inter alia, their policies 
within the framework of the OSCE. In their common statements to the Permanent Council of 
the OSCE they criticized the Russian Federation for not withdrawing their troops from 
Moldova or Georgia or for supporting separatists in Transdniestria, Abkhazia or Nagorno-
Karabakh. They also discussed plans for pipelines and transport corridors which were to bring 
                                                                 
82  AP Flux 06.06.2001, Russian Federation Denied the Participation to the Arrest of the Members of the 
“Ilascu Group”. 
83  Infotag 20.04.2001, ... and Ratifies Agreement on Military Co-operation with Russia; Basa-Press 
20.04.2001, Moldovan Parliament Ratifies Agreement on Military Co-operation with Russia. For more de-
tails see Basa-Press 13.04.2001, Parliament Eyes Military Cooperation between Moldova and Russia. 
84  Infotag 04.05.2001, Moldova-Russia Treaty Drafting Enters Crucial Stage.  
85  AP Flux 12.06.2001, The Foreign Political Priorities of the Republic of Moldova Must be Determined by 
Economic Reasons. 
86  Infotag 30.05.2001, Moldova's Critical Export Goods Excluded from Free Trade Regime. 
87  Infotag 28.03.2001, Moldova Asks for Debt Restructuring. 
88  AP Flux 12.06.2001, The Foreign Political Priorities of the Republic of Moldova Must be Determined by 
Economic Reasons. 
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oil from Azerbaijan further to the west without going through Russia. During the recent Yalta 
summit, Voronin and the four other Presidents, underlined, however, that GUUAM is not 
directed against Russia. GUUAM was to a certain extent institutionalised at this summit 
through the adoption of a charter. Plans to sign a free-trade agreement did, on the other hand, 
not materialise89. Co-operation within the GUUAM framework does not cause headaches for 
the Moldovan president precisely because it is relatively weak and because it will not develop 
into a anti-Russian political and or military union. According to Voronin ‘Everything that is 
done – the Euro-Asian Commonwealth, customs union, GUUAM, Russia-Belarus Union– has 
to be looked upon through the developing relations within the CIS’90. Thus, Moldova, which 
also received observer status in Euro-Asian Economic Community during these weeks seems 
to be ready to integrate into very different inter-state structures in the CIS-area as long as it 
does not antagonise either Russia or Ukraine by doing so. Ukraine is Moldova's second big-
gest trading partner after Russia. Trade with Ukraine makes up 11.6 percent of Moldovan 
exports and 12.4 percent of imports91. Moreover most Moldovan exports have to pass through 
Ukraine before they reach their final destination. Thus, a good relationship with Ukraine, es-
pecially in the economic field, is essential for Moldova. It is therefore not surprising that 
Moldova would only join the Euro-Asian Economic Community jointly with Ukraine. Be-
sides good export and transit opportunities, Moldova also expects the Ukraine to continue its 
constructive role as a mediator in the Transdniestrian conflict and the resolution of several 
bilateral issues – like the destiny of Moldovan property in Ukraine or the final border demar-
cation between the two countries. During Voronin's visit to Kiev on 18 May, it became clear 
that the Moldovan President is seeking a good and pragmatic relationship with its eastern 
neighbour. In the course of the visit, agreements on visa-free border crossing, on the recipro-
cal recognition of documents for educational and scientific degrees, on scientific and techno-
logical co-operation in the agriculture field and on co-operation between the ministries of 
justice, culture, and education were signed92. Such issues are not spectacular, but they touch 
on areas which are important for Moldova's further development. However, pressing prob-
lems also remain to be solved in this relationship. Recently, the Moldovan parliament post-
poned the ratification of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border treaty, which foresaw the trade of 
the 7.7 km-long section of the Odessa-Reni road, situated on Moldovan territory, for a 100-
metre corridor of Ukrainian Danube riverbank93. The latter which Moldova needs for the 
finalization of the Girgulesti oil terminal in south-western Moldova. This decision was moti-
vated by vehement protests by the inhabitants of Palanca village, which is situated between 
this road section and the border and which would be cut off from the rest of Moldova, if the 
decision were implemented. The failure to ratify the treaty will also block the recognition of 
Moldova's property worth 500,000 US-Dollar on Ukrainian soil, and thus, might harm 
Moldova's economic interests and its relationship with Ukraine. 
 
Pragmatism can also be observed with regard to Voronin's approach to Moldova's western 
neighbour, Romania. The relationship between Chisinau and Bucharest seems not to have 
suffered much after the Communists came to power in Moldova. Voronin's second visit 
abroad led him directly to Bucharest where he agreed with his Romanian counterpart, Ion 
Iliescu, that the relationship between the two countries should be based on ‘pragmatism’. The 
development of economic and commercial relations as well the modernisation of the infra-
structure linking the two countries are the prime objectives of the new leadership in Chisinau. 
                                                                 
89  See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 09.06.2001, Eurasische Vernetzungen. 
90  Basa-Press 02.06.2001, Voronin did not Discuss Moldova's Acccesion to Russia-Belarus Union in Minsk. 
91  Infotag 18.05.2001, Ukraine is Moldova's Second Biggest Trade Partner, after Russia. 
92  Infotag 18.05.2001, Moldova and Ukraine Sign 6 Cooperation Documents. 
93  Moldova Azi 26 iunie 2001, Ratificarea tratatului de frontiera cu Ucraina va fi amanata, at: 
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Not bridges of flowers as was the case in 1991, but real bridges count in 2001. The Romanian 
approach does seem to be directed in the same direction and accordingly, Romania strongly 
advocated Moldova's adherence to the Stability Pact which enables both countries now to 
look for funds to start with four infrastructure projects: the rehabilitation of the Iasi-Chisinau 
and Galati-Chisinau road, the reconstruction of a bridge near Lipcani and the construction of a 
new railway track based on European standards from Ungheni to Chisinau. To enable its citi-
zens to use these links in the future, Moldova has to provide international passports for them, 
as Romania introduced a new travel regime to begin on 1 July 2001. As neither the Moldovan 
state nor most of the villagers along the border are able to bear the costs of the now compul-
sory passports, funds have been requested from abroad. Romania is ready to cover half of the 
2.5 million US-Dollar required, the Stability Pact should provide the rest – at least according 
to Chisinau and Bucharest94. Thus, there is some common ground for developing the prag-
matic relationship between both governments. The establishment of business centres in 
Chisinau and Bucharest, the creation of a body for relations with Romania alongside the 
Moldovan cabinet and of inter-ministerial committees in Bucharest and Chisinau95 are signs 
which support this assumption. Problems of course remain, although Moldova is ready to sign 
the basic political treaty between the two countries some difficult work has yet to be done to 
remove the historical and symbolic obstacles, which have blocked signature thus far: Romania 
favours the notion of ’two Romanian states’ and would like a reference to the Ribbentrop-
Molotov-Pact included in the treaty, which is not acceptable for the Moldovan side96. Further-
more, one has to be beware that Romania itself is a relatively poor country which will require 
massive funding to prepare itself for accession to the European Union. Thus, although Roma-
nia supports Moldova's bid for the integration in European structures it has only limited funds 
available to assist it financially and would certainly proceed with accession to the European 
Union without Moldova.  
 
Hence, financial assistance for Moldova has to come from somewhere else. According to For-
eign Minister Cernomaz the chief driving force behind Moldovan external policy remains the 
same – integration into the European Union. With regard to the Russian-Belarusian Union, 
certain accents have been placed exclusively on economic co-operation97. And although the 
Communists have voiced criticism of NATO expansion, they have not questioned Moldovan 
participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace Programme98. Contradictions in this foreign 
policy concept, however, remain. The idea, for instance, that Moldova might once integrate 
into the European community together with Russia and Belarus, hardly seems a realistic op-
tion.99 This ambiguity and the strategy for Moldovan politicians to say very different things to 
different audiences have already caused the IMF to halt loans for Moldova until a clearer pat-
tern can be identified. For its part, the European Union has so far not reduced its engagement 
in Moldova and has proceeded with the process of including Moldova in the Stability Pact. 
The EU has an interest in a democratic and stable Moldova and sees the 2001 election results 
in a pragmatic way, the voters at least have provided the parliament with a stable majority, 
which could be used to conduct the necessary economic reforms100. 
                                                                 
94  Pact Co-ordinator Hombach advised the Moldovan side to look for internal funding, but did not rule out a 
contribution by the Stability Pact altogether, see Infotag 15.06.2001, ...and Pact Project Funding to be Dis -
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Moldova's co-operation in the framework of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement 
ratified in 1998 as well as its adherence to the Stability Pact by end of June and to the World 
Trade Organisation at the beginning of May have given backing to statements by Moldovan 
leaders that the country is indeed further interested in market reforms and closer European 
integration. According to the Moldovan Ambassador in Germany, the Republic of Moldova is 
primarily interested in relationships, which might help the country overcome its socio-eco-
nomic crises, and is seeking such relationships in East and West. As a matter of fact, the 
Moldovan side is often more ready to integrate than the European Union is ready to accept 
this country101. It took Moldova two years to be accepted for the Stability Pact and neverthe-
less, Moldova was not included in the Free-Trade Agreement concluded with the other mem-
ber states of the Pact102. 
 
The Stability Pact is not only regarded by the Moldovan side as a step forward towards the 
EU, it is also a resource for the financing of important infrastructure programs like the ones 
described above and for support in the fight against crime and corruption. In order to receive 
funds, Moldova will be required to present concrete proposals for projects with regional sig-
nificance like the ones mentioned above. As with regard to the WTO membership and the 
Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with the European Union, concrete measures must 
be taken in Chisinau in order to implement these international agreements. If Moldova is 
ready to do so and if it stays on a reform course, it might receive the economic support it 
needs so desperately from Western states and international financial organisations. Voronin 
also seems to have understood this. Although Moldova has named Russia as a strategic part-
ner it has not abandoned the idea of European integration. The pragmatic foreign policy con-
cept of the new leadership is certainly ambiguous and in part difficult to pursue, but given 
Moldovan economic requirements – gas and demand for Moldovan goods from the East, 
loans and investments from the West – there is hardly any alternative. In any case, it is much 
more promising than the ‘Moldova goes East’-scenario described by some Western observers 
this spring.  
 
 
6. Voronin and the Transdniestrian Conflict: Same Procedure as Every Year? 
 
Alongside economic reforms and foreign policy, the Transdniestrian conflict was the third 
main area expected to be affected by the change of power in Chisinau. As laid out in the new 
government programme, the settlement of the Transdniestrian crisis and wider economic co-
operation with the former Soviet republics will be the primary objectives of the Tarlev gov-
ernment.103 At first glance, one might actually argue that after the Communists came back to 
power in Chisinau, the prospects for the solution to the Transdniestrian conflict increased 
considerably.  
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s the conflict between the Transdniestrian region and the cen-
tre had two main cleavages:  
· a linguistic (Russian/Moldovan) one, which was fuelled by different interests as well as by 
strong symbolism on both sides and which had strong economic implications; 
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· an ideological (Soviet Union/Western democracy) one which ran almost parallel to the 
linguistic conflict.104 
 
As for the linguistic cleavage, it has been reduced considerably by the announcement of the 
PCRM to declare Russian the official second state language in Moldova, Moldovan adherence 
to the Russian-Belarusian Union as well as their clear attitude to the question of unification 
with Romania (‘Njet!’). Although some of these promises will not be fulfilled in the end and 
although the Communist leadership has made it clear that it considers it important that non-
Moldovan citizens learn the language of the titular nation, it can hardly be expected that Rus-
sian speakers will have to face discrimination and lay-offs under Communist rule in Chisinau. 
The Communist aim in assisting Russian speakers in learning Moldovan might, today, even 
be welcomed by Transdniestrians. In any case, the official Transdniestrian propaganda against 
the threats of Romanization lost its value after 25 February and the linguistic cleavage, which 
fuelled the conflict ten years ago, is not a source of conflict today. The same is primarily true 
for the ideological cleavage which once reinforced the conflict. The ideological differences 
between the new Moldovan President and his Transdniestrian counterpart have to be regarded 
as negligible. In the run-off to the Moldovan elections, the PCRM was supported by the 
‘Communist opposition’ in Tiraspol, which was later on harassed by the Transdniestrian au-
thorities.  
 
Thus, taking this situation into account and considering the models of power-sharing and 
autonomy which have been worked out over the past years with the help of three mediators 
(OSCE, Russia, Ukraine), in 2001 all the conditions seems to be in place to be able to over-
come the issues which caused the Transdniestrian conflict in 1991/92.  
 
As a matter of fact, however, the Transdniestrian conflict is fuelled by different issues now 
than it was in 1990/92. Today, the stabilisation of the status quo is mainly based on the inter-
ests of power in Tiraspol as well as of ‘profiteers’ in Chisinau. It is further reinforced by the 
interests of the Russian Federation in the region, which in the past has used the Trans-
dniestrian conflict to gain maximum influence in Moldova and to prevent the withdrawal of 
its troops, which are still stationed in Transdniestria. Thus, even the landslide victory of the 
Moldovan Communists might not defrost the conflict instantly – although the new leadership 
might be more ready to accept a federalisation of Moldova and although it might be closer to 
the current leadership in Tiraspol in terms of ideology. As time has passed, fair models of 
power sharing and similar political concepts have not been the only aspects that count in the 
relationship between Chisinau and Tiraspol. 
 
In order to find an explanation for the continued cold peace in the Transdniestrian region after 
over eight years of OSCE conflict management, one has to look not only at the causes of the 
1992 war as well as the OSCE mediation efforts but also at certain factors and divisions, 
which have emerged since 1992 that have increased the complexity of the Transdniestrian 
conflict. 
 
Since its declaration of independence on 2 September 1990 the ‘Transdniestrian Moldovan 
Republic’ (‘PMR’) has successfully established and consolidated its own state-like structure. 
In Transdniestria, alongside a president and a parliament there are, inter alia, a supreme court 
and a national bank, which issues its own currency, the Transdniestrian rouble. Border ser-
vices, the police, internal security and border guards serve alongside the army as important 
pillars of power. Strong symbols like the constitution, the national anthem, the coat of arms, 
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flags and several monuments commemorating the 1992 war, have strengthened the Trans-
dniestrians ideological base. One has to concede, that the ‘PMR’ functions relatively well, at 
least from the point of view of its rulers and some influential groups, which support them. The 
position of a ‘president’ of an ‘independent’, albeit unrecognised, state might not only be 
more prestigious than that of a governor of a special autonomous region of the Republic of 
Moldova, but it also assures control over certain economic resources. It might not be a coinci-
dence, for example, that Smirnov’s son controls the Transdniestrian customs department and 
it is quite understandable that Smirnov will seek a third term in office.  
 
The economic resources controlled by the Transdniestrian leadership include a metallurgical 
plant in Ribnita and other well functioning enterprises. In addition, however, contraband and 
illegal trafficking are said to be strong sources of income as well. Transdniestria has become a 
‘black hole’ in the region from which organised crime can operate, goods can be smuggled 
and money can be laundered. The open ‘border’ between these two de-facto economically and 
politically separated entities allows, for example, the ‘tax-free’ import of fuel products, ciga-
rettes and alcoholic drinks to Moldova via Transdniestria105. In addition, the illegal trafficking 
of drugs, weapons and human beings and related criminal activities are also widespread in the 
region. 
 
In addition to these economic interests which are linked to the present state of affairs, the is-
sue of personal security also plays a role. Influential figures in the security forces like Vadim 
Antyufeev and other former OMON officers are wanted by Interpol for the crimes they com-
mitted in Latvia in 1990/91. They might well dare to go shopping in Chisinau today, but they 
would feel much more uneasy if a political settlement were reached. Thus, as far as Tiraspol 
is concerned there is hardly any political will on the side of the ruling elite to conclude an 
agreement. So far, for them the best alternative to a negotiated agreement has been the status 
quo – at least in the short term.  
 
Interestingly, as has been argued by Moldovan and foreign observers106, there is also a lack of 
interest in Chisinau in changing the status quo. In order to fight the contraband problem the 
Moldovan government decided on 1 June 1999 to establish 17 permanent customs posts and 
30 mobile posts along the inner-Moldovan ‘administrative border’ with Transdniestria and 
also along the frontier with Ukraine. The purpose of these posts is to ensure the collection of 
value-added tax and excise duties, and to halt the traffic in contraband goods107. Judged by 
today’s standards however, these posts do not seem to be very effective. Trafficking, contra-
band goods and other criminal activities have not been effectively halted. An economic 
blockade of Transdniestria has also not taken place. The Moldovan government had no inten-
tion of implementing the latter because it was well aware of Moldova’s own vulnerability. All 
major roads, pipelines and train connections heading eastward pass through Transdniestria, 
thus Tiraspol has the opportunity to retaliate against any attempts to seal off Transdniestria. 
However, given the fact that various parts of the political class in Chisinau apparently also 
profit from contraband and illegal trafficking108, there might have been additional incentives 
not to take customs controls between Transdniestria and Moldova too seriously. Given, that 
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some of these profiteers are also said to be related to the Communist party and given the ele-
ment of continuity in the new government, this attitude might not have changed. Thus, the 
existence of special elite interests in Tiraspol and Chisinau alike, will make conflict resolution 
in Moldova a complicated task also in the future.  
 
Russian interests in the region have also to be taken into account when discussing the reasons 
for the continued cold peace in the Transdniestrian region. Even today there are probably still 
several different foreign-policy actors in Moscow109, which support Transdniestria to different 
degrees. Over the years, stabilising support for Transdniestria has come especially from the 
red-brown forces in the State Duma. On the other hand, former President Yeltsin and now 
President Putin cannot be listed as strong allies of the current regime in Tiraspol. There is, 
however, a strong interest from the Russian side in keeping Moldova within the Russian orbit. 
Leverages for this purpose exist in the economic (gas, ownership of Moldovan enterprises), 
military (in the former 14th Army) and political (Transdniestria) sphere. Maintaining pressure 
on the Moldovan government by retaining Russian troops in Transdniestria and helping the 
‘PMR’ to survive, very much serve this interest. 
 
After the 2001 parliamentary elections, however, the question could have been raised whether 
the Russian goal to bring Chisinau closer to Moscow might have been achievable without 
Transdniestria. Russia has been named as ‘strategic partner’ of Moldova by President Voronin 
(see section on foreign policy above). Moreover, the Communists had promised in their elec-
tion campaign they would consider the question of adherence to the Russian-Belarusian Un-
ion. Voronin had also indicated that the question of Russian troop withdrawal was not an is-
sue of major importance for the new leadership in Chisinau. In the newspaper of the Commu-
nist Party, the possibility was even raised that the Moldovans might allow Russia to keep a 
permanent military base in Moldova110. A rapprochement between Chisinau and Moscow 
combined with the principal attraction for most Transdniestrians of a common, Communist-
ruled Republic of Moldova would put the Tiraspol leadership in a difficult situation and 
would threaten their current position. As a matter of fact, leading PCRM-figures have already 
expressed their negative attitude to the current regime in Tiraspol and have indicated that a 
change of power in Tiraspol would be a feasible step on the way to conflict resolution111. 
 
For the time being, however, the new leadership in Chisinau has engaged in serious negotia-
tions with the Transdniestrian leadership. Meetings on the leadership level were held on 11 
April, 16 May, and 20 June with another summit scheduled for 8 August. Thus, it seems that 
the monthly meetings planned between Voronin and Smirnov will take place according to 
schedule. On 16 May, four agreements prepared by expert groups since the first summit on 11 
April were signed. These agreements dealt with harmonising the tax and customs legislation 
guarantees to attract and protect foreign investments, co-operation in investment activities, 
measures to promote unimpeded activities of the mass media, distribution of periodicals, TV 
and radio programs on the Moldovan and Transdniestrian territories and recognition of docu-
ments issued by Transdniestrian authorities112. As was the case in past years, implementation 
of these protocols will continue to be difficult. The Transdniestrian side, for example, an-
nounced immediately after the summit that it will introduce new Transdniestrian passports 
and demanded their recognition on the basis of the protocol on the recognition of documents – 
                                                                 
109  See Suzanne Crow, The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia under Yeltsin, Munich, 1993; Neill Melvin, 
Russians beyond Russia, London. 1994; Neill Melvin, Forging the New Russian Nation, London, 1995; Pål 
Kolstø, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1995. 
110  Basa-Press 03.04.2001, Political Commentary. 
111  AP Flux 02.04.2001, Pentru a solutiona diferendul transnistrean, este nevoie sa fie schimbata puterea de la 
Tiraspol, potrivit liderilor comu nisti.  
112  Infotag 16.05.2001, Voronin and Smirnov Sign Several Agreements. 
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a demand the Moldovan side was not even ready to consider. Voronin even used this incident 
to point out, that although he had made compromises in the last few weeks, he would not 
overstep certain limits113.  
 
Whereas the Transdniestrian side tries to restrict negotiations to economic matters and to use 
them as a means for consolidating its independence114, Voronin and his team – still led by 
Vasile Sturza who was appointed by Lucinschi – focus on a political solution for the 
Transdniestrian conflict. Although the unexpected release of Ilie Ilascu – who was sentenced 
to death by a Transdniestrian court for terrorist acts committed during the 1992 conflict – at 
the beginning of May and the regular meetings on the expert as well as on the leadership level 
seem to indicate progress in the negotiating process, one should keep in mind that the posi-
tions on the core issues of sovereignty and power have remained unchanged. The new leader-
ship in Chisinau aims at an integrated and intact Moldova, which might be at best a federa-
tion, while Tiraspol sees the ’common state’ as kind of confederation formed by two inde-
pendent subjects, Transdniestria and Moldova. These differences became clear at the summit 
on 20 June, where an open exchange of opinions on the core questions of the status issue took 
place115. This kind of open dialogue might, in theory, indeed be a starting point for construc-
tive negotiations aimed at overcoming existing differences. In reality, however, the chances 
that the Transdniestrian leadership would concede on the core points of the status questions 
are – for the reasons laid down above – practically nil.  
 
As indicated before, there were prospects for real movement in the status negotiations after 
the elections. In this scenario, Moscow and Chisinau were able to agree to settle the status 
question together with the question of troop withdrawal. In a press conference after the elec-
tions, Voronin indicated that Moldova might legalise the Russian troop presence, while Pri-
makov mentioned the possibility of concluding an agreement with Moldova on stationing 
Russian troops in Moldova or accepting an OSCE-mandate for a Ukrainian-Russian peace-
keeping mission in Transdniestrian116. Thus, it appeared Chisinau might be ready to grant 
Russia the right to station its troops legally on Moldovan territory in exchange for a solution 
of the Transdniestrian conflict. Although Russia certainly does not have full control over the 
regime in Tiraspol it does have the power to put considerable pressure on it. Otherwise, it 
would be very hard to explain the release of Ilascu just several weeks before a hearing on this 
case would have taken place before the European Court for Human Rights, Russia being one 
of the accused states. Moreover, a branch of the Russian party, Edinstvo (Unity) was estab-
lished in Transdniestria. This party is, like the Transdniestrian organisations close to the 
PCRM, in opposition to the current regime in Tiraspol without being in opposition to Russia. 
Thus, one solution would be, that Russia puts pressure on the current regime and at the same 
time lends its support to more pragmatic people who would be ready to strike a deal with the 
Communists in Chisinau. Having gained legal status for its troops in Moldova, a government 
in Chisinau leaning towards the Russian Federation, which has increased control over the 
Moldovan economy, Russia might very well feel that it does not need the ‘PMR’ anymore. 
For the Moldovan Communists, on the other hand, the solution of the Transdniestrian conflict 
would by any means justify Russian troops in the country and maybe even the adherence to 
the Russian-Belarusian Union and the introduction of Russian as second state language. Thus, 
theoretically a political solution for the Transdniestrian conflict emerged after the Commu-
nists came to power in Chisinau – not because they were now in a position to strike a deal 
                                                                 
113  Infotag 12.06.2001, ... Negotiations with Tiraspol are Approaching a Limit that cannot be overstepped. 
114  Basa-general 04.05.2001, Primakov Planted a New Trap against Chisinau. 
115  Infotag June 21, 2001, Vasile Sturza Comments Summit Results. 
116  Basa-general 19.04.2001, Primakov Says Federalisation of Moldova is a Solution to Dniestr Crisis. 
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with Tiraspol more easily, but because they might strike a deal with Russia and because they 
might be accepted by the majority of the Transdniestrian population. 
 
Recent developments, however, seem to indicate that this scenario is unlikely. The Russian 
Federation has apparently not abandoned Transdniestria and Moldova for its part has recon-
firmed – within the framework of the second CFE Review Conference – the necessity of full 
compliance with the Istanbul decisions. The Moldovan government has made it clear that it 
expects Russia to withdraw its troops within the deadline set at the Istanbul summit117 and has 
even stated that Transdniestrian resistance to the withdrawal will not be accepted as an ex-
cuse. There was pressure to withdraw Russian troops again after the OSCE presented the Rus-
sian government with a document that certifies that the expenses in connection with the troop 
withdrawal or with the destruction of Russian weapons based in eastern Moldova would be 
financed by OSCE participating States – primarily from the West. For this purpose a volun-
tary fund was set up by the OSCE118. The adoption of a Russian-Transdniestrian protocol on 
the withdrawal of Russian troops119 and an agreement to construct a OSCE-financed plant for 
the destruction of the munitions stored in large quantities in Transdniestria were further steps 
forward in this process. However, the record of the last few years makes one sceptical, as 
signed protocols have rarely been implemented. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Moldova 
has stopped sending signals that a bilateral agreement on the stationing of Russian troops in 
eastern Moldova might be possible. Thus, it seems that the principal positions of the three 
directly affected actors of the Transdniestrian conflict have not changed much. A Communist-
ruled Moldova might still be attractive to many Transdniestrians and acceptable to Russia, 
although the plans to introduce Russian as second state language, to join the Russian-Belaru-
sian Union and to allow a permanent Russian military presence in Transdniestria seemed to 
have been abandoned. The pressure on Smirnov and his entourage might remain high. How-
ever, as long as it is not high enough to change the leadership in Tiraspol as well, a solution to 
the Transdniestrian conflict remains unlikely. 
 
In connection with Transdniestria it has also to be mentioned that Western lack of interest 
contributed not only to the outbreak of violence in Transdniestria in 1992120, it also gave Rus-
sia the leeway to set the standards in the negotiation process afterwards. In April 1997, then 
Russian Foreign Minister Yevegni Primakov, broke the deadlock in the Moldovan-Trans-
dniestrian negotiation process by introducing the notion of a ‘common state’ into the text of a 
memorandum, which was signed by the parties on 8 May the same year in Moscow. The 
OSCE Mission, which alongside the representatives of the Russian and the Ukrainian presi-
dents has acted as a mediator in the conflict, was not present when Primakov introduced the 
notion of the ‘common state’. Although, not particularly happy with this formulation, the 
OSCE has had to accept the new text. Today, Russia insists on this imprecise and ill-fated 
notion also within the framework of negotiations related to the other two ‘frozen conflicts’ in 
the OSCE area – Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh121. Thus, one has to realise that every 
                                                                 
117  The respective part of point 19 of the Istanbul Summit Declaration from 19 November 1999 reads: ”We 
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document signed, every formulation accepted within the framework of one set of negotiations 
would have direct impacts on others in related conflict settings. To handle the Moldovan-
Transdniestrian conflict as a minor, isolated problem, affecting only four million people 
means to leave the problem to others who may use this area as an influential test ground. The 
treatment of the Transdniestrian conflict will have impacts on the process of conflict resolu-
tion in Nagorno-Karabakh (Abkhazia as well as South Ossetia) and later on perhaps also on 
Chechnya, Kosovo and other regions where separatist conflicts have emerged. 
 
Moreover, the question of Russian troop withdrawals is not only of regional importance but 
will directly affect the ratification process of the adapted CFE Treaty. During the last nine 
years, Russia has managed to monopolise the international peace-keeping role in Trans-
dniestria and in 1996, it was also able to use parts of its former 14th army as peacekeepers, 
although this military formation was initially excluded from this kind of a role by the 1992 
agreement. Thus, Russia has shown its willingness to keep at least a symbolic military pres-
ence in the region and might continue to maintain this presence if the West does not continue 
putting pressure on Russia to obey its commitments to the 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul 
and live up to its obligations in the CFE Treaty.  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
What are the main conclusion one can draw after 120 days of Communist rule in Moldova? 
First, although Moldova will lean more towards Russia and although market reforms in the 
country cannot be excepted to accelerate – as would actually be necessary – the country is not 
lost for the West. And second, it would be in the West’s own interest not to write Moldova off 
and engage in an open and constructive dialogue with the Moldovan leadership in order to 
demonstrate that Moldovan problems can be solved doubtless only through co-operation with 
the West – under the condition that the country strengthen its efforts to play according to the 
rules and to fight nepotism and corruption. 
 
Although Moldova is a small country with minor strategic significance today, it is important 
to follow events in Moldova and to take them seriously. Russia has tested strategies here, 
which it later used in other countries and might do so in the future. A continued lack of inter-
est in the country would also make it easier for Russia to consolidate its control over the 
country and to increase the pressure on Ukraine to follow the same road.  
 
Given that Moldova has a strong Russian minority, established economic, historical and cul-
tural ties with Russia and that it will also need future Russian markets for its exports and Rus-
sian gas for heating and electricity, Russian influence in Moldova should not be regarded as 
something negative as such. However, this influence should not be hegemonic. Thus, the 
West should not try to antagonise Russia, but to co-operate with the Moldovan and the Rus-
sian governments in order to enhance stability and economic development in the region.  
 
Given that there is a continued interest from the side of the Moldovan Government to inte-
grate into European structures and to pursue market reforms, the West should offer Moldova 
financial assistance, a programme for restructuring its debts and a perspective to integrate 
economically and politically further into European structures. The existing agreement with the 
IMF, the Stability Pact and the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with the European 
Union seem to be adequate frameworks at the moment, which, however, have to be used ac-
tively by the Moldovan side. The decision of the German government to suspend its technical 
assistance to Moldova should be revised, the more so as it has not been based on clear politi-
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cal or development criteria. The prerequisite for Western financial assistance will, neverthe-
less, be that the country strengthens its efforts to play according to the rules and to fight 
nepotism and corruption. A pragmatic Communist leadership that controls all the branches of 
power, but is by no means comparable to the non-democratic regimes in Belarus or Central 
Asia might very well be a reliable partner for the West. The Communists are not the ones re-
sponsible for the state of Moldovan economic affairs, described in the recent IMF-report on 
Moldova122. That situation can be attributed to the preceding governments under the presiden-
cies of Mircea Snegur and Petru Lucinschi.  
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